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The number of financial regulatory
authorities and financial stability:
Cross-country experiences
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Romora Edward Sitorus

Abstract

This paper attempts to provide evidence whether or not the unification of regulatory institutions for
different types of financial sector creates challenges for financial stability. From a sample of 91 countries
that provide data on the financial unification index and the central bank involvement index, the empirical
results reveal that higher financial unification index or the convergence toward a single supervisory
institution outside the central bank, in order to control three different sectors (banking, insurance, and
securities), is detrimental for financial stability. However, this finding only holds for developed countries,
but dissapears for less developed countries. In parallel, the central bank involvement in financial sector
supervision has no impact on financial stability in both developed and less developed countries.
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I. Introduction
The combination of globalization, liberalization, and deregulation forces has significantly
reduced cost of capital and its ability to move around the globe. Those phenomena have been
accompanied by the development of sophisticated new financial instruments and the emergence
of new players, such as sovereign wealth funds. These changes are beneficial overall, but they
have also been accompanied by frequent financial disruptions, such as the Asian currency
crisis in 1997, Russian financial crisis in 1998, the Argentine crisis in 2001 and the sub-prime
mortgage crisis in 2007.
Admittedly, such financial crises had incurred large macroeconomic costs. Goldstein et al
(2000) find that the cost of public-sector bail-out of banking crises could add up to 10 percent
or more of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. During Asian financial crisis,
for instance, the cost of banking crisis amount to 10 percent of GDP in the case of Malaysia,
16 percent for South Korea, 30 percent for Thailand, and even up to 58 percent of GDP for
Indonesia.
Singala and Asher (2008) argue that financial innovations, exemplified by the growing
complexity as well as variety of financial products, along with the emergence of new global
financial players have led to an unprecedented increase in global financial assets and flows.
While these changes have brought about improved liquidity, reduced transaction costs and
more risk management options, they have created major challenges for macroeconomic
policymakers. As incidents of financial disruption and volatility increase and as their economic
costs become significant, ensuring financial stability has become a major preoccupation of
financial supervisory authorities including central banks. Achieving financial stability has therefore
become an increasingly dominant objective in economic policymaking, as financial stability is
now considered as a public good (Schinasi, 2005b).
This paper attempts to focus on one of issues of achieving financial stability through
the role of supervisory authorities. Previous studies as described in this paper (Section 2) have
highlighted the pros and cons of the unification of financial supervisory authorities, since it might
affect the effectiveness of financial supervision within each sector (i.e. bank, financial market,
and insurance). Aside from the unification of financial supervisory authorities, considerable
debate remains with regard to whether the presence central banks presence is compulsory
in conducting the financial sector supervision. To our best knowledge, previous studies have
not yet examined whether such trends affect financial stability through the banking stability
channel. Given the fact that banking is a major financial sector in both developed and developing
countries, assessing financial stability through banking stability becomes relevant.
In order to assess the level of unification of financial supervisory activities and central bank
involvement in financial sector supervision, we use a detailed dataset on financial unification
index and central bank involvement index established by Masciandaro (2009). Building on
Masciandaro (2009), we then examine the impact of financial unification index and central
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss1/1
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bank involvement on banking stability. A closer look is also conducted by examining whether
such a link is dependent on the degree of economic development. Some studies on financial
stability also distinguishes developing countries and developed countries due to the differences
in macroeconomic policies that may in turn affect financial stability (e.g. Uhde and Heimeshoff,
2009; Schaeck et al., 2009).
Finally, the rest of this paper is structured as the following. Section 2 describes our literature
review. In Section 3, we present our data, variables and methodology. Section 4 provides our
empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.

II. Theory
2.1. Unification Trends Infinancial Supervision
The reform in financial supervision landscape in recent years has indicated a trend toward
a unified agency. Abrams and Taylor (2002) and Llewellyn (2006) argue that because of the
increasing formation of financial conglomerates as well as the convergence of function among
different types of financial institutions, single supervision authority for all financial system is
increasingly considered as one the most viable supervision model. The reformation of supervisory
authority started by the establishment of financial supervisory authority (FSA) in UK by 1997
and the development of similar institution by Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s. Despite
of that, not all countries have decided to follow complete unification of financial supervision
(Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2008).
Moreover, Masciandaro (2007, 2009) has attempted to explore the driving factor of recent
unification reforms in financial supervision and find that the level of unification in supervision
depends on the policy of the central bank and the behavior of policymakers (helping-hand or
grabbing-hand type). Moreover, Kremes et al. (2003) and Wymeersch (2006) also documents
that there are various different factors affecting the model of supervisory structures, such as:
history, financial structure, political system, country and financial sector size.
There are many reasons why countries follows integrated supervision. Gaganis and
Pasiouras (2013) argue that unified supervision could: (i) allow synergy among multitude
supervisory functions and knowledges, (ii) change and reduce unnecessary controls and
regulatory loophole, (iii) create economies of scale in organization, (iv) improve supervisory
effort, since the single supervisor allow clearer responsibilities in the system. Moreover, Čihák
and Podpiera (2008) mention that the main cause for supervision is related to issue of efficiency
and effectiveness. In the new financial landscape, where financial conglomerates are thriving,
unified supervision among agencies could potentially get rid of duplicated functions, and create
synergy.
On the other hand, there are also some counter argument agains the policy toward
intergrated financial supervision. For instance, Demastri and Guerrero (2005) discuss the moral
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2015
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hazard issues caused by the “Christmas tree effect”, in which the single regulator may become
alienated from the industry, and therefore may result to regulatory capture. Moreover, Boyer
and Ponce (2012) argue that separate supervisory powers among supervisors is susceptible to
the capture of supervisors by bankers.
Furthermore, Čihák and Podpiera (2008) also note that some points against unified
supervision. First, it is possible that integrated supervision may blur the objectives of financial
supervision. Second, synergy may not be achievable when different industries are not well
harmonized. Third, Integration can create diseconomies of scale. Last, unified supervisor may
even further the moral hazard problems to the system. They also mention that the process of
unification may bring other risks. The risks include the following (i) some potilicians may push
for integrated supervision despite it may not necessarily be optimal, (ii) the process could reduce
the effectiveness of supervision by special interests, (iii) loss of key staff, and (iv) possibility
of mismanaged integration process (for instance, “clash of cultures” between integrated
agency)
Through empirical study, Barth et al. (2002) show that country with multiple supervision
agency usually have low capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and thus greater risk of insolvency.
Meanwhile, Barth et al. (2003), find that integrated supervision increase bank performance.
Čihák and Podpiera (2008) also argue that higher integration of supervision is related with better
quality of insurance and securities supervision and higher consistency of supervision among
sectors. Within different form of supervision, model that integrate supervision but separate
business conduct and prudential supervision (twin peaks) is more efficient. Moreover, they also
argue that central bank involvement does not necessarily improve supervisory quality.
Some literatures also attempt to examine the relationship between level of supervisory
unification and their performance (Arnone and Gambini, 2006; Čihák and Podpiera, 2006).
Moreover, other researches find that country charactersitics may influence the type of supervisory
regime (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2008; Masciandaro et al., 2008). Recently, Masciandaro et
al. (2012) also predict the impact of changes in supervisory architectures in governance toward
economic resiliences. According to them, higher supervisory integration and better governance
may even adversely related with the resilience of the economy.

2.2. Central Bank Involvement in Financial Supervision
Studies regarding central bank involvement in financial supervision are extensive. The early
study went back to Bagehot (1873) which proposes that central banks (CB) play an important
role in bailing out illiquid but solvent banks. If the world is frictionless, bank could borrow some
amount from the market. However, when banks’ financial health is uncertain, this borrowing
strategy is difficult to implement. Thus, in most cases, central banks has to step in as lender of
last resort (LLR) to provide better financial evaluation about the banks’ condition.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss1/1
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Early study, such as Paroush (1988) showed that there are two reason why monetary
authorities is important in supervising and regulationing banking industry. The first reason is
that, monetary authorities has the capabilities to perform monetary policy, and therefore capable
to control money supply by putting limitations toward banking industries. The second reason
is that, monetary authorities have the authority to conduction restriction against “irresponsible
conduct” of banks and ensure the soundness of financial ecosystem. Two reasons above –
monetary and stability policy – become the main arguments why central bank involvement is
needed in the banking industry.
Despite of that, Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) and Eichengreen and Dincer (2011)
shows that there is in increasing trend of diminishing central bank involvement in the supervision
of financial industry. According to Cukierman (2011), although central bank involvement as
systemic regulator may be important to provide necessary liquidity injection when a crisis
erupts. However, this injection may negatively compromise the independence of central bank
in the long term.
In the literature, there exists pros and cons regarding central bank involvement in the
financial supervision. Some studies argues that central banks involvement could provide
economies of scale and informational advantages (Blinder, 2010, Lamfalussy, 2011; Papademos,
2010), and better equiped human capital to manage supervisory issues (Lamfalussy, 2011).
On the other hand, some studies argue that central bankers may fall captive to the interest of
banking industry (Boyer and Ponce, 2011, 2012), and the unification between monetary and
supervision function in the central bank may produce complicated bureaucracy (Blinder, 2010;
Goodhart, 2010; and Eichengreen and Dincer, 2011)
Other literatures suggest that central bank involvement in supervision may well be avoided
because of the empirical results that shows (i) bank profit efficiency tends to decrease as the
number of financial sectors monitored by central banks increases (Gaganis, and Pasiouras, 2013),
(ii) the performance of financial market is better when supervision is conducted by agency outside
central banks (Eichengreen and Dincer, 2011), and (iii) Central bank involvement in supervision
does not affect macroeconomic resilience during financial crisis (Masciandaro et al., 2011).
By summarizing the views above, we may conclude that central bank involvement in
financial supervision brings trade-off between benefit and cost. Most studies are concerned
that central bank involvement in financial supervision may encourage central banks to relax
monetary policy standard in order to solve the issues in the financial sector. This relaxation, in
turn, could create problem for both monetary and financial stability.

III. Methodology
Our sample consists of 91 countries in 2006 in order to be consistent with the index of
financial unification and central bank involvement for 2006 established by Masciandaro (2009)

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2015
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as the latest literature that discusses the issues of financial supervisory unification and central
bank involvement. All financial development data comes from the Global Finance Database
established by the World Bank. Meanwhile, the list of variables is defined as follows.

3.1. Financial Stability
Following Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) that assess financial stability through a measure
of bank stability, we employ banks’ probability of default as a proxy for financial soundness.
Specifically, we employ the Z-score technique (e.g. De Nicolo et al, 2004) which is denoted as
follows:

ZSCORE =

µ+k
σ

This indicator is constructed per country by aggregating the banks’consolidated balance
sheet and use μ as a symbol to define the return on average assets before taxes (ROAA).
Moreover, k is defined as the equity-to-total asset ratio and σ as the standard deviation of ROAA.
Moreover, we argue that value Z-score will improve together with the banks’ profitability and
capital ratio and decrease during higher return volatility. In this case, the Z-score measures the
bank insolvency probability when asset value turns out to be lower than the debt value. The
refore, a greater (lower) Z-score implies a lower (greater) default probability.

3.2. Explanatory and Control Variables
This paper retrieves two explanatory variables of interest from Masciandaro (2012), such
as the financial supervision unification index (FSU) and the central bank involvement index
(CBFA)2. FSU is defined based on the number of authorities from 91 countries that provides
data related to supervisory activities in banking, securities market and insurance. Specifically,
higher FSU is associated with a greater financial supervisory unification toward a single authority.
Moreover, CBFA represents the extent to which the central bank has responsibility in supervising
three financial sectors (banking, securities or insurance). Higher CBFA means that the central
bank has a greater involvement in supervising at least one type of financial sectors (banking,
securities and insurance).
Several control variables are also incorporated in this study. First, we include the ratio
of total loans to total deposits (LDR) to control for liquidity risk. Greater LDR is also associated
with greater intermediation activities. As intermediation activities are a major source of risk, we
expect that there might be a relation between bank intermediation (LDR) and insolvency risk

2

See Masciandaro (2012) for a detailed discussion to construct FSU and CBFA.
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(ZSCORE). Inflation rate (INF) is also incorporated as a control variable, since it can also affect
bank insolvency risk through an interest rate channel as in Soedarmono et al. (2013). Finally,
we also control for the degree of market power in the banking industry (LERNER) that may
affect bank stability, although the direction of the relationship remains subject to considerable
debate until recently3. Eventually, it is important to note that we opt to limit the number of
control variables in order to maintain the degree of freedoms, since we have an unbalanced
sample with limited observations (91 countries).

3.3. Data Estimation
Given that we have a cross-sectional dataset, we thus directly use OLS (ordinary least
squares) as an estimation method. In terms of methodology, we run regressions in two stages.
First, we run regressions for all countries in the sample in order to see the impact of FSU and
CBFA on financial stability (ZSCORE) in general. Second, we divide our sample into two groups
consisting of developed countries and developing countries in order to examine whether
developed and developing countries have different characteristics that may influence the link
between FSU, CBFA and ZSCORE. In defining developed and developing countries, we initially
construct the median value of real per capita GDP from all countries. Developed (developing)
countries are countries in which their GDP are greater (lower) than the median value of GDP
from all countries, which is equal to USD 5,476.96. Specifically, we create a dummy variable
where developing countries are equal to 1 and developing countries are equal to 0.
In order to ensure that OLS estimators to be the best available estimator, the major classical
assumptions must be met. These include: (1) no multicollinearity amongst independent variables;
(2) errors term has zero mean; (3) no heterocedasticity in error terms; (4) no autocorrelation
amongst errors; and (5) no correlation between independent variables and error terms. In
running regressions, we also check whether the regression equations obtained fulfill such
classical assumptions.
Robustness checks are also conducted. First, we include control variables one by one, in
order to ensure that the impact of FSU and CBFA on ZSCORE is not altered due to the presence
or absence of other control variables. Second, we transform the functional form of independent
and dependent variables using a logarithm transformation and hence, the interpretation
regarding the impact of FSU and CBFA on ZSCORE remains similar with the previous models
in which we use variables in level.

3

See Soedarmono et al. (2013) for a comprehensive review on the link between market power in the banking industry and financial
stability.
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IV. Result and Analysis
4.1. All Countries
Table 1 intially presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. It can
be shown that the values of all variables are economically plausible and hence, no outliers
might be expected.

�������
���������������������������������������
������

���

����

���

���

������

����

������

�����

�����

�������

������

������

������

������

�����

�����

������

�����

������

�������

������

�����

�����

�������

��������

������

�������

�����

�����

�����

������

�����

������

���������

������

�����

�����

������

�������

�����

��

��

��

��

��

��

������������

Given that the multicollinearity issues between independent variables are crucial in OLS
estimations, we present a correlation matrix of all variables in Table 2. From Table 2, it is less
likely that our OLS models suffer from multicollinearity issues, since the correlation coefficients
amongst independent variables are relatively small (less than 0.5). Only FSU and CBFA exhibit
relatively higher correlation coefficient than other pairs (0.32). Hence, no multicolliearity
assumption in OLS estimations is not violated.
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In the next turn, we run regressions in order to examine the impact of FSU and CBFA on
ZSCORE in general. Table 3 presents our empirical results.
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From Table 3, it is shown that higher FSU index representing the extent to which financial
supervisory authorities becomes integrated outside the central bank tends to deteriorate
financial stability as ZSCORE declines. Meanwhile, the central bank involvement in financial
sector supervision (CBFA) has no impact at all on financial stability. These results are robust to
the presence or absence of other control variables as in Table 3.
All regression models presented in Table 3 are also valid, since they do not violate the
classsical assumptions of OLS estimations. Durbin-Watson statistics range around 2, thereby
autocorrelations amongst residuals are less likely to occur. In order to control for the presence
of heterocedasticity in residuals, we have used Huber-White robust estimates of the standard
errors.

4.2. Developed vs. developing countries
The result in this section distinguishes our sample into developed and developing
countries4. Table 4 and 5 summarizes the impact of financial supervisory unification (FSU) and
central bank involvement (CBFA) on financial stability (ZSORE) in developed and developing
countries, respectively. The R-square of most developed countries models are better than
the R-square of full sample and developing countries model. This shows that our model can
4

Using the mean equality test between FSU and CBFA index based on the group of countries (i.e. developed and developing
countries), we show significant mean difference between the two categories supporting our approach to examine the issue based
on developed and developing countries sub-sample. The result is not shown in this paper, but it is available upon request.
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explained the variation of ZSCORE in the developed countries better than in the developing
countries or full sample (global) model.
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Tabel 4 shows that the impact of financial supervisory unification (FSU) is significant
and negative in developed countries. The coefficient estimates for FSU range from -1.65 to
-1.95 with 1% significance level. This means that an increase a unit change in the FSU index
is associated with a 1.65-1.95 unit increase of the insolvency risk. In other words, the more
integrated financial supervision in a country, the less stable the financial/banking system
(ZSCORE) in the country.
Table 4 also suggests that inflation rate has statistically significant and economically large
impact toward financial stability in developed countries. The coefficient estimates for INF ranges
between -1.8 and -1.33, meaning that one-percentage point increase in inflation is associated
with a 1.8 to 1.33 percentage point decrease in financial stability. Previous studies supported
this result, for example Boyd et al. (2001) find that an increase in the rate of inflation interferes
financial sector ability to allocate resource effectively. They find that once the mean of inflation
rate exceeds 15 percent per year, financial sector performance decreases significantly. Moreover,
Soedarmono (2011) also find similar results by investigating 12 countries in Asia.
As we can see in Table 4, bank competition (LERNER) does not have significant impact
toward financial stability (ZSCORE), a result which is somehow inconsistence with previous
study on the “competition-stability” hypothesis or the franchise-value hypothesis. The possible
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss1/1
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explanation is that our study does not take into account time differences and thus, we cannot
control for time-fixed effects that may determine the significance of the link between LERNER
and ZSCORE. Nevertheless, given that our focus is not to study the link between LERNER and
financial stability, the absence or presence of LERNER in the models does not alter the impact
of FSU and CBFA on ZSCORE in particular.
Further, Table 5 shows that both financial supervisory unification (FSU) and central bank
involvement (CBFA) is not significant in explaining financial stability (ZSCORE) in developing
countries. Other papers, such as Beck et al. (2012) also show that bank stability varies across
income groups and even more over time. Ariss (2010) also documents that some factors may
have significant impact on financial stability in developed countries, but yield no significant
effect in developing countries.
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In order to ensure that our empirical results are robust, Table 6 – 8 provide robustness
checks on the link between financial supervisory unification (LOG_FSU), central bank involvement
(LOG_CBFA) and financial stability (ZSCORE). Specifically, we now change all independent and
dependent variables using a logarithm function transformation. The results in table 6 shows
consistent result with Table 4, where LOG_FSU significantly impact the financial stability after
controlling for LOG_INF and LOG_LERNER. Meanwhile, central bank involvement (LOG_CBFA)
has no significant impact at all on financial stability (LOG_ZSCORE)
As well, Table 7 shows similar results with Table 4. It shows that for developed countries,
LOG_FSU and LOG_ZSCORE are negatively related but no significant impact of LOG_CBFA on
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LOG_ZSCORE. Finally, Table 8 also indicates similar results with Table 5 where both financial
supervisory unification (LOG_FSU) and central bank involvement (CBFA) have no significant
impact at all on financial stability (LOG_ZSCORE).
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V. Conclusion
Using 91 country-level data in 2006, this paper generally strengthens the case in favor
of no need to establish an integrated financial supervisory authority for three different sectors
(banking, securities, and insurance) to improve financial stability. Specifically, our study provides
empirical evidence that financial supervisory unification has a negative impact on financial
stability as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic factors.
Our findings in general are somehow consistent with Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) that shows
banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit
efficient. Nevertheless, the negative link between financial supervisory unification and financial
stability only holds for developed countries, but dissapears for developing countries. Hence,
financial stability in developing countries seems to be less affected by the regulatory issues due
to the integration of financial supervisory authorities.
With regards to the central bank involvement (CBFA) in supervisory processs, we
additionally find that the presence or absence of the central bank in financial sector supervision
does not hinder financial stability in both developed and developing countries. This finding is
consistent with Masciandaro et al. (2011) which shows that the level of involvement of the
central bank in financial supervision does not significantly affect the resilience of the economy.
The effect the supervisory regimes toward resilience is, however, largely influenced with the
level of financial liberalization and regulation quality in public sector.
Eventually, our present paper provides several policy implications. First, we emphasizes
that the importance of integrating financial supervision agency is not evident when an economy
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experiences the growing number of financial conglomerate, such as in the case of advanced
countries. With this in mind, the conclusions in this paper suggest that once a country becomes
developed country, separated supervisory authorities may be associated with a better supervisory
consistency and quality, since it is very hard to achieve regulatory harmonization across banks,
insurance companies, and securities. Following Uhde et al. (2009), we further suggest that
improving cross-country cooperation between regulators and supervisors to clearly define
responsibilities for financial sector supervision is necessary. Moreover, our empirical results do
not against the unification of financial supervisory authorities in developing countries, since it
does not affect financial stability. However, policy makers in developing countries should be more
concerned with the potential problems of financial supervisory unification, once their countries
move toward a developed country status accompanied by greater financial development such
as the emergence of financial conglomerates and universal banking activities.
Second, although the central bank has a central role in the setting of monetary policies
to target inflation and safeguard macroeconomic stability in terms of the movement of interest
rate, exchange rate and so on; our results show that the presence or absence of the central
bank in financial sector supervision does not necessarily hinder financial stability. However, given
the role of the central bank as a lender of last resort in times of crisis, understanding several
macro-level indicators of financial stability becomes the keys for the central bank. In other
words, incorporating the central bank in financial sector supervision remains essential in order
to enhance the role of the central bank to establish an early warning system of crises using
financial indicators at the aggregate level. The role of the central bank as a lender of last resort
should be therefore accompanied by the ability of the central bank to conduct macroprudential
supervision on financial system as a whole.
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